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SEAMAN'S ACTIONS
THE SEAMAN'S PERSONAL INJURY ACTION
AND THE JURY TRIAL
Fred Kunzel*
The plight of the seaman who has suffered a personal injury is
one that historically has elicited the special attention of courts and
legislative bodies. Such special attention has manifested itself in the
form of varying remedies available to the seaman for the recovery
of damages. While the forms of these remedies themselves have
undergone substantial change over the past fifty years, the proce-
dures by which the right to such remedies can be asserted have
been in such a state of flux as to tax the capacities of even the most
able members of the bench and bar attempting to comprehend the
vagaries of the procedures involved.
Many of the questions relating to the manner in which the sea-
man is to seek recovery for his injuries are concerned with the
problems of whether the admiralty jurisdiction or the jurisdiction in
actions at law is to be invoked when the suit is brought in the
United States District Courts. These questions give rise to further
questions concerning the availability of trial by jury of the issues
presented.
This article will attempt to set forth some of the more recent law
dealing with such questions.
The right of a seaman to maintenance and cure extends to all
seamen who are members of the crew of any vessel. The right can
be traced to medieval times and was recognized in the United States
as early as 1823.1 Maintenance and cure awards cover all injuries and
illnesses of the seaman apart from those occasioned by his gross
misconduct or insubordination, and exist whether or not the injury
or illness arose out of the course of employment and without regard
to any negligence of the owner or crew of the vessel.2 The award
covers all living expenses and medical expenses of the injured sea-
man until cured, or at least until he is as well cured as he ever will
be, as well as for his wages until the contractual end of his hiring.'
The bases for the maintenance and cure award in the United States
seem to be the courts' stereotype of the seaman as a careless, im-
provident and friendless individual, as well as a public policy of
* United States District Judge, Southern District of California; A.B., Stanford Uni-
versity, 1925; J.D., Stanford University, 1927.
1 Harden v. Gordon, 11 Fed. Cas. 480 (C.C.D. Me. 1823).
2 Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949).
a Ibid.
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vigilance for the welfare of a class of citizens so vital to the com-
mercial life and defense of the nation.-
A second means for recovery that might be used by the injured
seaman stems from the absolute duty of a shipowner to furnish a
"seaworthy" vessel for his crew. While this duty is apparently
ancient in origin, it was not clearly recognized as furnishing a basis
for recovery of damages in the United States until the twentieth
century.5 The practice of suing for damages caused by the unsea-
worthiness of the ship did not really become popular until the
middle of the 1940's. 6 The right to damages for unseaworthiness,
a claim maritime in nature, is not predicated on the negligence of
the shipowner.! It is a breach of the absolute duty to provide a safe
place for the seaman to work' that gives rise to liability.
In addition to the judicially created maritime causes of action for
maintenance and cure and for unseaworthiness, the injured seaman
is afforded a statutory cause of action for negligently inflicted in-
juries suffered in the course of employment. The statute creating
this right of action, the Merchant Marine [Jones] Act, calls for an
action at law at the election of the seaman and sets forth the right
of trial by jury.'
Thus, two of the remedies available to seamen are, historically
speaking, maritime in nature and within the admiralty jurisdiction
of the federal courts. As maritime causes of action, suits for main-
tenance and cure and for damages caused by unseaworthiness would
not, if tried alone, be within the purview of the guarantee of trial
by jury provided by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of
the United States." On the other band, the remedy afforded by the
Jones Act may be sought in an action at law and the right to trial by
jury is specifically guaranteed in the statute creating the remedy.1
If the injured seaman were restricted to a single cause of action to
recover damages for his injuries it would not seem that any proce-
dural problems of insurmountable character would be presented.
4 Reed v. Caufield, 20 Fed. Cas. 426 (C.C.D. Mass. 1832).
5 The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).
6 Tefreault, Seamen, Seaworthiness and the Rights of Harbor Workers, 39 CORN13LL
L.Q. 381 (1954).
7 Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 U.S. 539 (1960). Note, The Doctrine of
Unseaworthiness in the Lower Federal Courts, 76 HAIv. L. Rav. 819 (1963).
s While the owner's duty to provide a seaworthy vessel is absolute, this "is not to
suggest that the owner is obligated to furnish an accident-free ship.... [I]t is a
duty only to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for their intended
use. The standard is not perfection, but reasonable fitness ... a vessel reasonably
suitable for her intended service." Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., supra note 7
at 550.
9 41 Stat 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
10 Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 447 (1830).
11 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
[V l. 2
SEAMAN'S ACTIONS
Problems have arisen, however, when counsel for injured seamen
exercised ingenuity and attempted to join either of the maritime
causes of action for maintenance and cure or unseaworthiness with
a cause of action arising under the Jones Act.
The question of whether federal courts, in the absence of diver-
sity, had jurisdiction to hear a claim for maintenance and cure or
unseaworthiness on the law side of the court was finally answered
in Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co. 2 The argument
had been made that the federal courts had jurisdiction to hear such
claims by virtue of a provision of the Judiciary Act of 1875,1" now
embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1331.14 This section sets forth the "federal
question" jurisdiction of the federal courts over "all civil actions
wherein the matter in controversy... arises under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States."1 The court, in Romero, re-
jected the contention that this provision was intended to grant origi-
nal jurisdiction to the United States District Courts to entertain the
maritime claims for maintenance and cure or unseaworthiness filed
on the law side simply because the Constitution of the United States
originally created the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts.'6
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the court, did not stop at this
juncture, however, but went on to hold that where the maritime
claim is joined with a claim based on the Jones Act and the suit
filed on the law side, the court would have "pendent" jurisdiction
over the traditional maritime claim by virtue of its jurisdiction of
the Jones Act claim."
While Romero did much to resolve uncertainty reflected in the
conflicting positions previously taken by the United States Courts of
Appeals for the various Circuits, not all controversy was ended.
Now that the maintenance and cure claim could be asserted on the
law side when joined with a Jones Act claim, would the traditional
maritime claim be determined by the jury to which the claimant
was entitled under the Jones Act? Mr. Justice Frankfurter was care-
ful to note that the question of whether the "pendent" claims under
the general maritime law "may" be submitted to the jury, was not
yet before the Court.'8
The question did present itself last term in Fitzgerald v. United
States Lines Co."9 The Supreme Court there held that, even assuming
12 358 U.S. 354 (1959).
23 Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
14 72 Stat. 415 (1958).
'5 Ibid.
16 358 U.S. at 380.
17 Ibid.
18 Id. at 381.
19 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
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the parties are of non-diverse citizenship, "a maintenance and cure
claim joined with a Jones Act claim must be submitted to the jury
when both arise out of one set of facts.""0 This holding came as no
great surprise, but it resolved great confusion which had plagued
the bar and the federal courts for many years. The confusion that
existed, and its background, is pointed up in the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit which the
Supreme Court reversed. 1 In an en banc decision, four Judges held
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a jury on his maintenance and
cure claim.2" Three Judges said that it was error not to submit the
claim to a jury," and two Judges said that the determination of
whether the claim should be submitted to the jury was within the
discretion of the trial court. 4 The diverse views of the Judges ex-
pressed the various positions taken by the United States Courts of
Appeal.
Mr. Justice Black, who has long championed the right to jury
trials, wrote the Fitzgerald" opinion. His opinion was forecast in
his dissent in Romero2" where he simply stated:
I cannot feel that the issue is either complex or earth-shaking. The
real core of the jurisdictional controversy is whether a few more
seamen can have their suits for damages passed on by federal juries
instead of judges.27
It should be noted that the Court, in its Fitzgerald opinion, re-
fused to again be drawn into the jurisdictional controversy, stating:
Nor do we find it necessary to reach petitioner's argument that we
should reconsider that part of the holding of Romero ... which
conduded that claims based upon general maritime law cannot be
brought in federal courts under the federal question jurisdiction of
28 U.S.C. § 1331.28 *
Thus, Fitzgerald adopted, at least by implication, the theory of
"pendent jurisdiction."
The same controversy over the right to a jury trial surrounded an
unseaworthiness claim when such was filed on the law side and
joined with a Jones Act claim, but the courts had less difficulty with
this situation. It was reasoned that the maritime claim of unsea-
20 Id. at 21.
21 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 306 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 374
U.S. 16 (1963).
22 Id. at 475.
23 Id. at 478.
24 Ibid.
25 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
28 'Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.s. 354 (1959).
27 Id. at 388.
28 Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 18 n. 3 (1963).
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worthiness was so entwined with the Jones Act claim that both
claims should be submitted to the jury.29 The case which finally
adopted this logic was Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc."
For some time there has been no difficulty found in granting a
jury trial of all issues when maritime issues were joined with a Jones
Act claim in a case where the parties were of diverse citizenship
and where the amount in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional
amount set forth in the statute conferring diversity jurisdiction on
the lower federal courts.3' That no conflict existed over the question
of the right to a jury trial in such cases was assumed by the Supreme
Court in Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd. 2
Now that it is settled beyond doubt that a jury trial will be af-
forded an injured seaman who files his action on the law side of the
United States District Court where he claims maintenance and cure,
indemnity for unseaworthiness, together with a Jones Act claim,
whether or not there is diversity of citizenship between the parties,
it must also be remembered that the other side of the coin is that in
such a situation the defendant can likewise demand a jury. If the
defendant's right toa jury trial is not assured by Rule 38(b) of the
Federal Rules .of Civil Procedure, it certainly seems that the court
should not deny the defendant an order for a jury trial in light of
the right of the plaintiff to the same type of trial.
There is no doubt among experienced plaintiffs' and defendants'
lawyers alike that many cases do not try well to a jury. Many cir-
cumstances affect the determination of the advisability of a jury suit.
It is also well known that error is much more likely to creep into a
case tried before a jury. And, while a jury may be more likely to
award damages in a greater amount than a judge, a jury, on frequent
occasions, finds in favor of the defendant on the issue of liability,
where a judge would find otherwise. As a prime example of what
can happen, compare the evidence set forth in Ursich v. da Rosa
8 3
where the jury found no liability, with that reviewed in Brenha v.
Svarda,"4 where liability was found to exist after trial to the court.
It, therefore, becomes of interest to determine what a plaintiff can
29 It should be noted that the ability to join the claim for unseaworthiness with a
Jones Act claim does not mean that dual recovery can be obtained. Recovery by
the seaman on either claim is deemed mutually exclusive. Pacific S.S. Co. v. Peter-
son, 278 U.S. 130 (1928); GitOR.E & BLAcK, ADMIRALTY 289 (1957).
30 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1000 (1959).
31 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1958).
32 369 U.S. 355 (1962).
3 328 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied .................. U.S ................... 85 S. Ct.
(Nov. 23, 1964).
34 291 F.2d 188 (9th Cir. 1961).
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do to avoid a jury trial now that he is assured of the right to a jury
trial if he so desires.
By tradition, there is no right to trial by jury of a maritime claim
filed on the admiralty side of the court. This is true whether the
claim is asserted in rem, by way of a libel against the ship, or in
personam, by way of a libel directed against the individual subject
to liability."5 An exception to this rule is the Great Lakes Statute,"
where Congress has granted a right to a jury trial of unseaworthi-
ness claims arising out of the business of commerce and navigation
on and between the Great Lakes, although it has been held that this
right to jury does not extend to actions for maintenance and cure."7
There is no doubt that a claim for unseaworthiness and mainte-
nance and cure are maritime claims and thus can be filed on the
admiralty side of the United States District Court, by way of a pro-
ceeding either in rem or in personam. It is also now the law that a
Jones Act claim can be filed on the admiralty side of the court by
way of a libel in rem but not in personam.88 The latter rule is
founded upon the interpretation of the Jones Act provision that the
seaman "may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at
law . . ."I' to mean that the seaman had the alternative of either
filing his claim in an action at law or in admiralty." It has also been
held that by filing a Jones Act claim on the admiralty side of the
court the right to trial by jury is not waived if a motion is made to
transfer the case to the law side of the court within ten days after
the case is at issue, i.e., within the time to request trial by jury under
the provisions of Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.41 This right of the seaman to transfer, however, does not mean
that the respondent in a Jones Act suit filed on the admiralty side
has a corresponding right to have the suit transferred to the law
side in order to obtain a jury trial.42
35 5 MooRE FEDERaL PaAcriCE 269 (2nd ed. 1951);
2 BENEDICt, AmErucAN ADMIRALTY § 244 (6th ed. 1940);
2 NoRIs, THE LAW OF SEAMEN § 677 (2d ed. 1962);
see also Note 10, supra.
88 28 U.S.C. § 1873 (1948).
37 Miller v. Standard Oil Co., 199 F.2d 457 (7th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S.
945 (1953), rehearing denied, 345 U.S. 971 (1953).
38 McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); Plamals v. Pinar
Del Rio, 277 U.S. 151 (1928); McCarthy v. American Eastern Corp., 175 F.2d
724 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 868 (1949).
39 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1952).
40 See cases cited note 38, supra.
41 McAfoos v. Canadian Pacific S.S. Ltd., 243 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 823 (1957); McLaughlin v. Blidberg Rothchild Co., 163 F. Supp 33(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
42 Texas Menhaden Co. v. Palermo, 329 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1964).
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It would thus seem dear that there is no right to try a maritime
claim by a jury, and that this includes a Jones Act claim filed on and
not transferred from the admiralty side of the court. Certain lan-
guage in Fitzgerald v. United States Lines,43 however, may detract
from any unequivocal character of this conclusion. The language is
as follows:
While this Court has held that the Seventh Amendment does not
require jury trials in admiralty cases, neither that Amendment nor
any other provision of the Constitution forbids them. Nor does any
statute of Congress or Rule of Procedure, Civil or Admiralty, for-
bid jury trials in maritime cases. Article III of the Constitution
vested in the federal courts jurisdiction over admiralty and mari-
time cases, and, since that time, the Congress has largely left to
this Court the responsibility for fashioning the controlling rules of
admiralty law."
At least one attorney for a plaintiff has interpreted the quoted lan-
guage as allowing a jury trial of a maritime claim on the admiralty
side of the court.45 In this case the plaintiff, an alien employed as a
longshoreman, brought an action on the law side of the District
Court against an alien shipowner, alleging unseaworthiness and
negligence, and grounding jurisdiction on a provision of the Judicial
Code which confers federal jurisdiction over certain tort actions
brought by an alien." The court granted a motion to dismiss be-
cause there was no jurisdiction. However, the court permitted the
plaintiff to transfer the case to the admiralty docket. At one point '
it appears that the plaintiff suggested that the court permit the case
to remain on the jury list. The court rejected this proposal, stating
that the quoted language in Fitzgerald8 "does not justify the exer-
cise of such discretion on this record."4 The court, however, hedged
somewhat by stating:
Particularly in view of the congested docket of this court, no per-
suasive reason has been advanced by plaintiff justifying this court
to exercise its discretion to grant a jury trial in this case, even as-
suming, which the court does not decide, that the court had the
power to exercise such discretion.50
Under the present state of the law the District Court was, without
doubt, correct in its statement and did not have to add the "make-
weight" statement about the congested calendar.
43 374 U.S. 16 (1963).
44 Id. at 20.
45 Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 225 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1963).
46 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1948).
47 225 F. Supp. at 297 n. 30.
48 374 U.S. 16, 20.
49 225 F. Supp. at 297 n. 30.
50 Ibid.
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In addition to the advisability of a jury trial, one other factor
should be considered by counsel for the injured seaman before he
determines whether to try his suit on the law side or whether to
choose the admiralty side of the District Court; that is the award
of prejudgment interest. The common law rule, of course, is that
prejudgment interest on an unliquidated tort claim is not allowed.
On the admiralty side of the court, however, the rule may be differ-
ent. From earlier cases developing the practice of awarding prejudg-
ment interest on awards for property damage in collision cases, "
the application of restitutio in integrum was extended to awards
resulting from deaths of crew members who died in maritime acci-
dents.5 2 The final extension of the practice has taken place in cases
awarding damages for personal injury of seamen where death has
not resulted."3 The rationale behind the award of prejudgment in-
terest is that the defendant's liability arises at the time of injury
rather than at the time of the later award of damages by the court
and also that the plaintiff's loss is immediate and thus he is damaged
by a delay in the award of compensation for such loss. These equi-
table considerations have led some District Courts exercising their
admiralty jurisdiction, and thus applying principles of equity, to
include an award of interest on elements of present loss suffered by
the injured seamen to compensate for the delay between injury and
judgment."
The harbor worker, unless he can be classified as a seaman, has
no Jones Act remedy and therefore he cannot invoke the concept of
"pendent jurisdiction." " Thus, absent parties of diverse citizenship,
his action cannot be filed on the law side of the District Court.
There is, however, no question that a harbor worker's claim against
a shipowner for unseaworthiness and negligence can be filed on the
admiralty side of the court."
Of course, any maritime claim involving seamen or harbor work-
ers can be filed in a State court under the statute conferring exclu-
sive jurisdiction over civil cases of admiralty jurisdiction, "saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are otherwise
entitled."5 7 It must be remembered, however, that federal statutes
51 Standard Oil Co. v. So. Pacific Co., 268 U.S. 146 (1925); The President Madi-
son, 91 F.2d 835, 845 (9th Cir. 1937).
52 National Airlines, Inc. v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959).
53 Petition of City of New York, 332 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied ............
... U.S ....... ....... ., 85 S. Ct. (Nov. 23, 1964).
54 Ibid.
55 Poole v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 273 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1960).
5 Id. at 424.




and federal maritime substantive law must be applied to actions
brought in State courts.58
In the action brought in the federal court the injured seaman, but
not a harbor worker, may file suit without payment of fees or surety
for costs and no jury fees are exacted.5" This fact will, of course,
color the choice of forum. In addition, the State court verdict is
reached when a 9-member majority of the jury agrees. In the federal
court the verdict must be unanimous. Like the question of the right
to a jury, this coin also has two sides.
The foregoing material illustrates that while the advisability of a
jury trial of the claims of the injured seaman is at least questionable,
his right to have such a trial in an action at law has recently been
made clear. Many questions remain unanswered and the answers to
those presently settled are certainly subject to change as Congress
and the courts continue to regard the seaman as an individual re-
quiring their special attention.
58 Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
59 28 U.S.C. § 1916 (1948).
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